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 Chapter 8 
 Inclusive Transboundary Water Governance 
 Anton  Earle and  Marian  J.  Neal 
 Abstract  Transboundary watercourses, including rivers, lakes and aquifers (con-
fi ned and unconfi ned), shared between two or more countries, are home to over 
70 % of the world’s population and supply water for roughly 60 % of global food 
production. It is no surprise that the management of these watercourses has been 
entrusted to national states, which have the power to take sovereign decisions over 
their management, use and conservation. State sovereignty is mitigated through the 
existence of a global institutional framework comprised of customary international 
water law (the norms dictating how states behave), global and regional conventions, 
basin-level agreements and basin management organisations. The good news is that 
there is a large body of joint institutions between countries with transboundary 
watercourses, the UN estimating that around 3600 exist. This in part explains the 
relative lack of military interstate confl icts. Less good news is that despite the exis-
tence of international- and basin-level agreements and basin organisations, the ben-
efi ts to be expected from international cooperation around transboundary 
watercourses have in most cases not materialised. Acute, persistent and seemingly 
intractable problems persist, with ecosystem degradation not being reversed, joint 
investments in water infrastructure not materialising and joint management organ-
isations failing to attract signifi cant long-term support from the respective basin 
states. Despite at least two decades of concerted support by the international devel-
opment community, the impacts of enhanced interstate cooperation are noticeable 
through their absence. This chapter investigates why this may be so and introduces 
a starting point which moves beyond the state-centric approach to transboundary 
water management. In doing so it does not challenge the sovereign right of states to 
manage their watercourses; instead it shows how a range of non-state actors do in 
fact infl uence state practice through a variety of mechanisms. As these mechanisms 
are frequently covert, it becomes diffi cult to assess the integrity of the relationships 
between actors, in turn making public engagement and participation diffi cult. 
Needed is a governance paradigm which opens the decision-making arena to 
 non- state actors all in support of the national governments and their respective man-
dates. This chapter ends with an indication of what such a governance arrangement 
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would look like across the four success factors identifi ed in the preface of this book: 
science- informed decision-making, investments in appropriate infrastructure, devel-
opment of skills and talent and the water use behaviour of stakeholders. 
 Keywords  Transboundary water management •  Customary international law • 
 Cooperation •  Justice •  Governance frameworks 
8.1  Introduction 
 The UN Human Development Report of 2006, which focuses on water issues, con-
cludes that the “scarcity at the heart of the global water crisis is rooted in power, 
poverty and inequality, not in physical availability” (UNDP  2006 : 2). In essence this 
is a crisis of governance. This message is echoed by a range of international organ-
isations (UNDP  2006 ; UNESCO  2008 ; UNEP  2009 ; UN-Water  2008 ; Jacobsen 
et al.  2013 ; World Bank  2013 ). 
 Lacking are effective organisations and institutions for the sustainable develop-
ment and management of the world’s water resources (Bigas  2012 ). This ineffec-
tiveness manifests itself in the poor state of freshwater ecosystems, which according 
to the Worldwide Fund for Nature is the most degraded of all the biomes (WWF 
 2012 ). Of the world’s 177 large rivers (those over 1000 km), only 64 remain free 
fl owing, unimpeded by dams and other barriers, while only 21 of these large rivers 
retain a direct connection with the sea (WWF  2012 ). Water resources are under 
increasing pressure from human growth, activities and settlement (WI  2010 ), indus-
tries and cities that consume vast quantities of water and have to convey water over 
increasing distances to satisfy demands (UN-Habitat  2010 ) and production of crops 
for food and fuel that use ever-increasing amounts of water. 
 Transboundary water resources, including rivers, lakes and aquifers that are 
shared between two or more states, further complicate effective water governance, 
by introducing an international-political dimension. Approximately 276 river basins 
cross international borders and serve as a primary source of freshwater for approxi-
mately 40 % of the world’s population. These basins are home to over 70 % of the 
world’s population and supply water for roughly 60 % of global food production. 
About 30–50 % of the world’s population depend on groundwater source from 608 
transboundary aquifer systems (IGRAC and UNESCO-IHP  2015 ). 
 Water management and allocation decisions that are made at the international 
and national levels often rely on national and subnational organisations for their 
implementation and often rely on civil society and/or local communities for their 
acceptance and legitimisation. This chapter illustrates the imperative for the inclu-
sion of non-state actors in the decision-making architecture of transboundary water 
governance. 
 This chapter will fi rstly clarify a number of terms used in the chapter; it then 
describes the issue of a state-centric approach and the problem that this creates; the 
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concept of multilevel governance is then discussed as a concept that could shed 
some light on the issue; we then delve into more detail on the organisational struc-
ture of transboundary water governance, followed by an exploration of water justice 
and social inclusion. 
8.2  Clarifying Terms 
8.2.1  Scales and Levels 
 There are many defi nitions of scale and level in the literature, and the terms are 
often confl ated. For the purposes of this chapter, it is useful to distinguish between 
these two terms. Thus the term scale refers to different ordering systems for space, 
time, administration and jurisdiction (Ramasar  2014 ); and the term level refers to 
points along a scale which in most cases takes on a spatial unit of analysis, for 
example, global, basin, state, province and local levels (Gibson et al.  2000 ; Cash 
et al.  2006 ). 
8.2.2  Organisations and Institutions 
 The decision-making architecture of transboundary water governance comprises 
two scales, namely, organisation and institution. In this chapter the defi nitions from 
North ( 1990 ) are adopted, where institutions are considered “the rules of the game” 
and include principles, policies, regulations, legislation, conventions, agreements, 
treaties and social norms and organisations are considered the “players”, for exam-
ple, government departments, non-government organisations, civil society groups, 
river basin organisations, municipalities and community-based organisations. These 
organisations and institutions can be explicitly mapped out for each transboundary 
water issue of interest as a mechanism to develop a deeper understanding of the 
levels within each scale that comprise this architecture. 
8.2.3  The Issue: A State-Centric Approach 
 The management of transboundary waters naturally falls within the ambit of the 
state. The state is the referent level that is entrusted and empowered to make sover-
eign decisions over the management, use and conservation of these shared waters. 
In relation to water, state sovereignty is upheld through the existence of a global 
institutional framework comprised of customary international water law (the norms 
dictating how states behave), global and regional conventions and bilateral or 
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multilateral basin-level agreements and treaties. The UN estimates that approxi-
mately 3600 joint institutions exist between states to govern transboundary water 
resources (UN-Water  2013 ). 
 However, despite the existence of these institutions, the benefi ts to be expected 
from international cooperation over transboundary water resources have in most 
cases not materialised as expected (Earle et al.  2010 ). Acute, persistent or seemingly 
intractable problems persist, with ecosystem degradation continuing unabated, joint 
investments in water infrastructure not materialising and joint management organ-
isations failing to attract signifi cant long-term support from their respective basin 
states. Despite at least two decades of concerted support by the international devel-
opment community, the impacts of enhanced interstate cooperation are noticeable 
through their absence (Earle and Bazilli  2013 ). These challenges pose a risk to other 
interventions seeking to promote development, peace, regional integration, ecosys-
tem protection and poverty eradication in a transboundary context. Coupled with 
the multiplier effects of climatic change, there exists a real possibility of tensions 
over water escalating at various levels (Ki-Moon  2007 ; NATO  2010 ; OSCE  2010 ; 
Department of Defense (DoD)  2010 ; NIC  2012 ). 
 States at times choose to engage in cooperative processes, while at other times, 
or indeed in other basins, they do not. In the majority of research efforts on trans-
boundary water governance, states are viewed and analysed as homogeneous units, 
with an assumption that water resource use and allocation occurring at the national 
level will cascade down to a broad range of users (Sneddon and Fox  2006 ; Hirsch 
and Jensen  2006 ; Suhardiman and Giordano  2012 ; Reed and Bruyneel  2010 ). The 
fl aw of this assumption is that it omits subnational actors and the role they may play 
in driving transboundary water governance processes at the national and interna-
tional level. 
8.2.4  Connecting the Scales and Levels 
 One thesis that could shed some light on the lack of cooperation over transboundary 
water resources is that of a multilevel governance approach. Multilevel governance 
is both a process and a description of governance architecture. It provides a frame-
work for describing the complex interaction and interdependencies between the 
plethora of “actors” and “rules of the game”. An explicit integration of the different 
levels within the organisational and institutional scales of governance is imperative 
for effective decisions over transboundary water resources to be made, implemented 
and accepted (Patrick et al.  2014a ). 
 Multilevel governance is an arrangement where institutions operate at various 
levels (e.g. local, regional, state, national, global) with multiple mandates and across 
different, but overlapping areas. The use of the term governance rather than govern-
ment refl ects the shift in decision-making powers from the state, where a state is a 
political and geopolitical entity administrated by a government, to non-state actors. 
The more nuanced understanding of this is not a complete shift in power but rather 
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a model of collective bundling of organisations that all infl uence the decision- 
making process (Patrick et al.  2014b ). The devolution of power to other government 
actors through a decentralised state model also adds to this new collective gover-
nance model. The sharing between different actors of the role of institutional devel-
opment, institutional formulation, institutional implementation and institutional 
regulation and monitoring add a further layer of complexity to our understanding of 
governance. 
 Multilevel governance is a network arrangement of institutions that can cooper-
ate to successfully manage common pool resources such as water. Some of these 
institutions may be initiated to manage specifi c aspects of natural resource manage-
ment such as water allocation, or they may be of a more general nature where water 
allocation is one aspect of a bigger portfolio. Each institution is essentially indepen-
dent of the other, although some may be nested, where the scope of authority is 
superseded by the next higher level or they may form an autonomous network of 
institutions with overlapping goals and policy objectives (Ostrom  1996 ). Suhardiman 
and Giordano ( 2012 : 304) contend that the distinctions between what constitutes a 
state and a non-state actor have become blurred, with overlap between these groups 
due to partnerships being formed as well as a movement of individuals between 
these groups. This leads state and non-state actors to develop “nested institutional 
structures” which manage resources at various levels of scale. 
 A multilevel institutional arrangement could distribute resources and capacities 
in such a way that any “perverse incentive and information problems at one level are 
offset to some extent by the positive incentives and information capabilities for 
actors at other levels” (Andersson and Ostrom  2008 : 73) and that this arrangement 
will achieve better water management outcomes than either a completely decentral-
ised or centralised institutional structure (Patrick et al.  2014a ). 
 There are various costs associated with a multilevel governance arrangement 
such as production, administration and bureaucratic costs (McGinnis  2005 ) that 
might exclude it as the most appropriate organisational arrangement for all prob-
lems and goals. It is, however, an appealing concept as it does not prescribe a spe-
cifi c blueprint governance model (Andersson and Ostrom  2008 ), and thus it can 
accommodate contextual issues and differences and make use of existing institu-
tional and organisational structures. It is a system that also acknowledges the 
dynamic nature of water resource governance and is thus more adaptive and respon-
sive to issues that arise at different levels and encourages a cooperative approach to 
addressing water management issues. 
8.2.5  A Closer Look at Organisational Structure 
 Earle et al. ( 2010 ) propose that transboundary water resources can provide an 
opportunity to contribute to regional development and peace if the organisational 
capacity exists to manage them cooperatively. They propose a conceptualisation of 
this organisational framework as consisting of three interrelated communities of 
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actors. They comprise the water management community (including water users 
from civil society and the private sector and water managers from governmental 
departments or agencies), international community (external to the basin actors 
such as researchers and development partners) and politicians in the basin states 
(see Fig.  8.1 ).
 These three communities interact in a variety of ways, infl uencing each other and 
learning from each other; however, the overall pace and direction of transboundary 
water governance processes is set by the politicians (as representatives of the central 
state). These communities are not heterogeneous; their components are exposed to 
a range of pressures and power dynamics operating at various levels, some within 
the water sector and some from outside. The nuances of pressures and power rela-
tions at a variety of levels need to be better understood if transboundary waters are 
not to become a source of confl ict or countries remain trapped in a state of “negative 
peace” – merely the absence of war (Earle et al.  2010 ). 
 Interested groups operate at a variety of levels and often place pressure on politi-
cians to provide them with access to resources, jobs or other services, in so doing 
Research, Academic &
IFIs - developing new
concepts,often based
on the solutions








Politicians - allocating values
in society, protecting state
intrest, sovereignty, rights
etc.Co-opt and support ideas
from the Researchers on their
terms.
 Fig. 8.1  The cogs within the organisational scale of transboundary water governance (Earle et al. 
 2010 ) 
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infl uencing the actions of these politicians at the international level (Earle  2013 ). 
The politicians in turn have fi nal say over the international water management 
regimes which they are willing to commit their respective country to; if there is the 
perception amongst local-level stakeholders that entering into an international 
agreement will negatively impact their access to water resources, then there is great 
pressure placed on politicians not to proceed with such an action. Thus states, as 
represented by politicians, are not the only actors possessing agency; they are but 
part of a range of actors that play a role in water governance frameworks (Earle 
et al.  2010 ). By better understanding the interests of these non-state actors, it may 
be possible to better understand some of the choices articulated by states at the 
international level (Earle and Bazilli  2013 ; Earle et al.  2015 ). 
8.3  Driving the Cogs 
8.3.1  Power 
 Issues around power become paramount at this point – with various subnational 
actors possessing better access to political decision-makers than others. As a result 
of what Allan and Mirumachi ( 2010 ) refer to as the “hydraulic mission” approach 
to managing and developing water resources, the primary actors in TWM processes 
have been states – represented by technical, economic and political elites operating 
in what generally gets termed “the national interest”. Left out are the local commu-
nities relying on the resource directly: the water users, poor, women and other 
important groups. Instruments such as the UN Watercourses Convention of 1997 
make an effort of presenting an attempt at an inclusive stakeholder approach – 
through asserting the importance of the “no-harm rule” and the “equitable share 
approach”. However, it lands up supporting the status quo through the omission of 
any reference to stakeholder issues or participation mechanisms. Likewise, regional 
transboundary laws such as the UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and the SADC Protocol on 
Shared Watercourses are found to be silent on issues related to stakeholder partici-
pation and gender (Earle and Bazilli  2013 ). 
8.3.2  Reframing Issues Across Levels 
 National interests and socio-economic imperatives drive the political agenda of 
individual nation-states. The uptake of transboundary water management and coop-
eration efforts could be greatly improved by reframing them in the national interest. 
The same can be said about human security needs. What mechanisms of reframing 
can be adopted by international- and local-level issues to align them more with 
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national interests? What compliance and implementation mechanisms of national 
interest priorities can be utilised to improve human and water security? We need to 
understand better how knowledge on regional water resources can more effectively 
feed into decision-making at different scales. We need to demonstrate how existing 
knowledge can add value. This is not only knowledge of biophysical systems but the 
political processes that drive choices and trade-offs. Can we reframe the “duty to 
cooperate” outlined in the UN Charter to move beyond state actors and identify a 
role of non-state actors? 
8.3.3  Shifting Power Dynamics 
8.3.3.1  Municipal to National to International 
 Cities are powerful actors since the majority of the earth’s population today live in 
urban areas, making cities important drivers of water resource management pro-
cesses (UN-Habitat  2010 ; Earle  2013 ). While municipal water use in most countries 
is a small portion of overall water use, it commands a high assurance of supply due 
to economic and political infl uence, placing cities in a strong position to compete 
for water resources across increasing distances. The quest for urban water security 
includes the provision of services directly related to water resources, such as elec-
tricity generated from hydropower, on international transboundary water manage-
ment processes. 
 Cities have driven several transboundary water governance processes, accessing 
central state politicians through a variety of mechanisms, some explicit and others 
not. In a study unpacking the role of cities on transboundary water processes, Earle 
( 2013 ) contends that cities infl uence the agenda in transboundary water governance 
in three main ways: (1) their increased capacity to pay for water resources (in com-
parison with rural water users) means that they can harness large-scale water trans-
fers for their use; (2) via their need for electricity and other services (such as fl ood 
protection) where cities are dependent on water resources; and (3) the need for their 
politicians to secure a political power base in the rural areas. For example, cities 
such as Johannesburg, Amman, Windhoek, Lusaka, Bangkok and Cairo have all 
played a driving role in the development of water resources or the evolution of water 
management institutions in the international transboundary basins around them. 
This can in cases lead to increased cooperation, where the water-related needs of 
cities have led to the development of new laws, institutions and collaborative infra-
structure projects. However, this same thirst can lead to increasing water stress in 
the basin as well as neighbouring basins, possibly resulting in confl ict at the inter-
state level. Further investigation is required to determine how the water-related 
needs of cities are articulated at the national level. Most likely it is not through any 
one channel or mechanism, but rather a range of actors that refl ect the needs of cities 
and (mostly independent of one another) motivate national governments to take up 
specifi c initiatives at the transboundary water level. 
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 Generally it is found that the role of cities in transboundary water processes is 
not often considered in research on transboundary water, making it important to 
reach a better understanding of this interaction (Earle  2013 ). By better understand-
ing this role, light is shed on the “black box” of interstate interactions around trans-
boundary water. Data and records of city-level planning and policies on water 
resources are, arguably, more accessible to researchers than the records of interstate 
negotiation and policy processes on transboundary watercourses. 
8.3.3.2  International Interests over Local Interests 
 International agreements or treaties are often used to codify water-sharing arrange-
ments between sovereign states, but there have been some cases where local com-
munities have been disproportionally burdened with some of the negative outcomes 
of decisions made at the international level. This is illustrated by way of example by 
the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, an international water-sharing project between 
Lesotho and South Africa. South Africa pays royalties to Lesotho for water trans-
ferred to its economic hub, and Lesotho receives hydropower electricity for its 
domestic use. The treaty signed between Lesotho and South Africa is considered by 
some as an example of good practice (Haas et al.  2010 ). However, the infrastructure 
involved in this interbasin transfer and hydropower scheme includes large dam 
development which has had signifi cant negative impacts on the long-term ability of 
the affected local communities within Lesotho to maintain their livelihoods even 
though they received monetary compensation or were resettled (Mokorosi and Van 
der Zaag  2007 ). This example illustrates that decisions that are sometimes consid-
ered good practice at one level (in this case at the international level between South 
Africa and Lesotho) do not necessarily translate to positive outcomes at other levels 
(in this case at the local community level within Lesotho). 
8.3.3.3  International Interests over National Interests 
 The state is treated as a “black box” with little possibility of gaining an insider’s 
point of view. This approach has been challenged by Hirsch and Jensen ( 2006 ) in 
their study on national interests in the Mekong River basin where they contend that 
the working assumption of the international partners supporting cooperative man-
agement structures of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) has been that the 
respective riparian governments represent the collective interests of the states 
(Hirsch and Jensen  2006 ). They fi nd a wide range of interests which are not easily 
reducible to “the national interest”, the result being that MRC institutional pro-
cesses are not implemented at national level – due to the lack of support within 
riparian countries. At best this represents a waste of taxpayers’ money from the 
countries supporting the development of the MRC; at worst it opens the possibility 
for specifi c interested groups in the basin to dominate the agenda and promote 
approaches which legitimise their objectives and standing. Appeals to the “national 
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interest” in doing so become a “discursive strategy often invoked to legitimise large 
infrastructure projects whose environmental and social consequences may in fact be 
quite disastrous” (Hirsch and Jensen  2006 : xviii). Put another way, “by virtue of 
their invocations of sovereignty and overarching concern with cooperation among 
riparian states over a highly abstracted notion of “water resource”, they are neces-
sarily oblivious to environmental confl icts involving non-state actors” (Sneddon 
and Fox  2006 : 197). 
8.3.4  Tracking Water Diplomacy 
 Water diplomacy is a process that enables countries to prevent, resolve or manage 
confl icts and negotiate arrangements or agreements on the allocation and manage-
ment of international water resources. It is a dynamic process that seeks to develop 
reasonable, sustainable and peaceful solutions to water allocation and management 
while promoting or infl uencing regional cooperation and collaboration. Water 
diplomacy can open up the cooperation dialogue to multiple stakeholders, including 
municipalities, provinces and civil society. Water diplomacy necessarily involves a 
suite of skill sets, with hydrologists, lawyers and political scientists sharing the 
negotiation table with diplomats and decision-makers. 
 Tensions over shared water resources are cross-cutting and often lie at the heart 
of national security priorities with close linkages to a wider set of economic, social 
and geopolitical issues (Patrick et al.  2014a ). At the international level, tensions 
over water resources can impact negatively on regional development, dampen resil-
ience to climate change and raise the risk of geopolitical instability. Conventionally, 
diplomacy is seen as high-level interaction and dialogue between nation-states. 
Diplomacy is now defi ned according to various levels and can be categorised into 
Track I, II and III diplomacy. These different tracks vary in terms of degree of offi -
cial (Track I) vs. unoffi cial dialogue (Track II); actors in the dialogue, high-level 
political and military leaders (Track I) vs. individuals and private groups (Track III); 
and the purpose of the dialogue: peace talks (Track I), sharing of ideas that inform 
the offi cial process (Track II) and empowerment of individuals and communities to 
participate in the negotiation process (Track III) (Snodderly  2011 ). 
8.3.5  Striving for Water Justice and Social Inclusion 
 Water allocation and management decisions made at one level, for example, the 
diplomatic or international level,  should translate into socially and environmentally 
acceptable outcomes at the local level. What do we mean by acceptable and how do 
we measure improvements in water and human security? How can local-level pro-
cesses and issues translate into national and international-political imperatives for 
peace and cooperation? Can we identify good practices of transboundary water and 
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benefi t sharing that contribute to human security? Are there explanatory variables 
for cooperation and confl ict that can be drawn from the social sciences? For exam-
ple, justice, ethics, faith and customs and spirituality are all in some way connected 
and infl uence human security. Are there underlying values and philosophies that can 
act as a catalyst for peace or confl ict resolution or require incorporation into water 
diplomacy efforts? 
 Reframing a problem, a solution or a system can be used as a means of including 
or excluding certain actors, perspectives and processes (Kurtz  2003 ; Van Lieshout 
et al.  2011 ). This process of inclusion and exclusion has also been examined in the 
justice literature, primarily by Susan Opotow. She explores it in the context of envi-
ronmental confl icts and has termed it the  scope of justice (Opotow and Weiss  2000 ). 
The scope of justice, also known as the scope of moral exclusion, has been defi ned 
as the psychological boundary for fairness (Opotow and Weiss  2000 ) or the bound-
ary within which justice is perceived to be relevant (Patrick et al.  2014a ). Principles 
of justice govern our conduct towards those within our scope of justice, while moral 
exclusion rationalises the denial of those outside our scope of justice (Opotow and 
Weiss  2000 ) and thus enables and justifi es the application of justice principles in an 
inconsistent or even in an unjust manner. 
 By obtaining a better understanding of the way in which non-state actors infl u-
ence transboundary water management, or are excluded from these processes, it is 
possible to gain access to what Allan and Mirumachi ( 2010 : 25) refer to as the 
“world of disappeared hydropolitics”. In situations of water scarcity, relations 
between states over water resources become politicised and possibly securitised, 
leading to decision-making disappearing from public view; researchers are not 
privy to the discussions and decision-making processes between central states, but 
by analysing some of the non-state actors and their interests (which are usually 
more openly stated), it is possible to gain an insight into some of the hidden prac-
tices of states. 
 Tensions also exist between international justice and social justice. The develop-
ment of theories of social justice has predominately focused on or assumed the state 
level rather than the international level (Cole and Schroeder  2004 ) and has resulted 
in much discussion about which should take precedence. The debate centres on 
whether international justice is only about relations between states or whether it is 
between people throughout the globe. This discussion is becoming more and more 
relevant with the globalisation of industry and commerce, and the development of 
supranational level organisations, and is a concern when discussing issues of justice 
within and between supranational entities, such as the European Union, and indi-
vidual persons whose claims for justice are largely confi ned to state structures. As it 
stands, issues of social justice at the local level as well as issues of social justice at 
the global level are seen as the responsibility of the state (Cole and Schroeder  2004 ); 
it is therefore an entity that matters for social justice. 
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8.4  Conclusion 
 In their article on process-based approaches to researching transboundary water 
management, Suhardiman and Giordano ( 2012 : 305) highlight the need to “better 
understand transboundary decision making processes, and how these processes are 
shaped by different actors’ interests, strategies, and access to resources within mul-
tiple governance levels and domains”. By gaining more insight into their roles as 
well as the way in which they are excluded from these processes, it should be pos-
sible to carry out a more effective analysis of the actions and positions adopted at a 
state level regarding transboundary water management. 
 The good governance of water resources is an integral part of promoting sustain-
able development globally (OECD  2012 ). What is needed is a governance paradigm 
that opens the decision-making arena to non-state actors, all in support of the 
national governments and their respective mandates. The rationale behind many 
international interventions to improve transboundary water governance is that the 
state is the prime actor amongst a range of other actors because they hold the main 
decision-making power. This has meant that the role of non-(central) state actors in 
transboundary water management has typically been under-researched (Suhardiman 
and Giordano  2012 ), producing only a partial picture of the full governance 
landscape. 
 The complexity of collaborative management institutions between countries, as 
well as the range of stakeholders within these countries (and the need for equitable 
and just allocation of resources between them), presents an opportunity to contrib-
ute to regional development objectives, provided that timely and well-structured 
institutions are put in place to avoid and mitigate the possibility of disputes develop-
ing into confl ict (Earle et al.  2010 ). All this needs to take place with due recognition 
of the probable impacts of climate change, with effective policies developed and 
implemented across all levels to mitigate as well as adapt to these adverse impacts. 
 References 
 Allan, J. A., & Mirumachi, N. (2010). Why negotiate? Asymmetric endowments, asymmetric 
power and the invisible nexus of water, trade and power that brings apparent water security. In 
A. Earle, A. Jägerskog, & J. Öjendal (Eds.),  Transboundary water management – Principles 
and practice . London: Earthscan. 
 Andersson, K. P., & Ostrom, E. (2008). Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycen-
tric perspective.  Policy Sciences ,  41 (1), 71–93.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/25474353 
 Bigas, H. (Ed.). (2012).  The global water crisis: Addressing an urgent security issue . Papers for the 
InterAction Council, 2011–2012, UNU-INWEH, Hamilton, Canada. 
 Cash, D. W., Adger, W. N., Berkes, F., Garden, P., Lebel, L., Olsson, P., Pritchard, L., & Young, O. 
(2006). Scale and cross-scale dynamics: Governance and information in a multilevel world. 
 Ecology and Society, 11 (2), 8. 
 Cole, P., & Schroeder, D. (2004). Justice beyond borders.  Res Publica, 10 (2), 107–113. 
 Department of Defense. (2010).  Quadrennial defense review (QDR) report . Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense (DoD). 
A. Earle and M.J. Neal
157
 Earle, A. (2013). The role of cities as drivers of international transboundary water management 
processes. In B. A. Lankford, K. Bakker, M. Zeitoun, & D. Conway (Eds.),  Water security: 
Principles, perspectives and practices . London: Earthscan. 
 Earle, A., & Bazilli, S. (2013). A gendered critique of transboundary water management.  Feminist 
Review ,  103 (Special Edition on Water), 99–119. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Earle, A., Jägerskog, A., & Öjendal, J. (2010).  Transboundary water management – Principles and 
practice . London: Earthscan. 
 Earle, A., Cascao, A. E., Hansson, S., Jägerskog, A., Swain, A., & Öjendal, J. (2015).  Transboundary 
water management and the climate change debate . London: Routledge. 
 Gibson, C. C., Ostrom, E., & Ahn, T. K. (2000). The concept of scale and the human dimensions 
of global change: A survey.  Ecological Economics, 32 , 217–239. 
 Haas, J. M., Mazzei, L., & O‘Leary, D. T. (2010).  Lesotho highlands water project: Communication 
practices for governance and sustainability improvement (World Bank Working Papers). 
Herndon: World Bank Publications. 
 Hirsch, P., & Jensen, K. M. (2006).  National interests and transboundary water governance in the 
Mekong (Draft report). Sydney: Australian Mekong Resource Centre (AMRC). 
 IGRAC, & UNESCO-IHP. (2015).  Guidelines for multi-disciplinary assessment of transboundary 
aquifers – Draft version . Delft: IGRAC Publications. 
 Jacobsen, M., Webster, M., & Vairavamoorthy, K. (2013).  The future of water in African cities: 
Why waste water? Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 Ki-Moon, B. (2007, September 14). What I saw in Darfur.  Washington Post , p. A13. 
 Kurtz, H. E. (2003). Scale frames and counter-scale frames: Constructing the problem of environ-
mental justice.  Political Geography, 22 , 887–916. 
 McGinnis, M. D. (2005).  Costs and challenges of polycentric governance . Workshop on analysing 
problems of polycentric governance in the growing EU, Humboldt University, Berlin. 
 Mokorosi, P. S., & Van der Zaag, P. (2007). Can local people also gain from benefi t sharing in 
water resources management? Experiences from dam development in the Orange-Senqu River 
Basin.  Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, 32 , 1322–1329. 
 NATO. (2010).  NATO 2020: Assured security; Dynamic engagement .  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/offi cial_texts_63654.htm?selectedLocale=en#p1 . Accessed 2 Nov 2011. 
 NIC. (2012).  Global water security: Intelligence community assessment . Washington, DC: 
National Intelligence Council. 
 North, D. C. (1990).  Institutions, institutional change and economic performance . Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 OECD. (2012).  Condition for success 1 “good governance” . Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
 Opotow, S., & Weiss, L. (2000). Denial and the process of moral exclusion in environmental con-
fl ict.  Journal of Social Issues, 56 (3), 475–490. 
 OSCE. (2010).  Shifting bases, shifting perils: A scoping study on security implications of climate 
change in the OSCE region . Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, 
Austria.  http://www.osce.org/eea/78357 . Accessed 2 Nov 2011. 
 Ostrom, E. (1996). Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy and development.  World 
Development, 24 (6), 1073–1087. 
 Patrick, M. J., Syme, G. J., & Horwitz, P. (2014a). How reframing a water management issue 
across scales and levels impacts on perceptions of justice and injustice.  Journal of Hydrology, 
519 , 2475–2482. 
 Patrick, M. J., Komakech, H., Mirumachi, N., Moosa, P. A., Salame, L., Shubber, Z., Van der Zaag, 
P., & Wolf, A. T. (2014b). Building bridges between the sciences and the arts of water co- 
operation – Refl ections.  Aquatic Procedia, 2 , 48–54. 
 Ramasar, V. (2014).  Fluid governance: Scalar politics in the South African waterscape . PhD the-
sis, Lund University, Lund, Sweden. 
 Reed, M. G., & Bruyneel, S. (2010). Rescaling environmental governance, rethinking the state: A 
three-dimensional review.  Progress in Human Geography, 34 (5), 646–653. 
8 Inclusive Transboundary Water Governance
158
 Sneddon, C., & Fox, C. (2006). Rethinking transboundary waters: A critical hydropolitics of the 
Mekong basin.  Political Geography, 25 , 181–202. 
 Snodderly, D. (2011).  Peace terms: Glossary of terms for confl ict management and peacebuilding . 
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. 
 Suhardiman, D., & Giordano, M. (2012). Process-focused analysis in transboundary water gover-
nance research.  International Environmental Agreements-P, 12 (3), 299–308. 
 UNDP. (2006).  Human development report. Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water 
crisis . New York: UNDP. 
 UNEP. (2009).  Water at a glance: The global crisis .  http://www.unep.org/ourplanet/imgversn/141/
glance.html . Accessed 3 Mar 2015. 
 UNESCO. (2008).  From potential confl ict to cooperation potential .  http://www.unesco.org/water/
wwap/pccp/ . Accessed 3 Mar 2015. 
 UN-Habitat. (2010).  State of the world’s cities 2010–2011: Bridging the urban divide . Nairobi: 
UN-Habitat. 
 UN-Water. (2008).  Tackling a global crisis: International year of sanitation 2008 . New York: 
UN-Water. 
 UN-Water. (2013).  International decade for action: Water for life (2005–2015) .  http://www.un.
org/waterforlifedecade/transboundary_waters.shtml . Accessed 30 Oct 2014. 
 Van Lieshout, M., Dewulf, A., Aarts, N., & Termeer, C. (2011). Do scale frames matter? Scale 
frame mismatches in the decision making process of a “mega farm” in a small Dutch village. 
 Ecology and Society, 16 (1), 38. 
 WI. (2010).  Biodiversity loss and the global water crisis: A fact book on the links between biodi-
versity and water security . Wageningen: Wetlands International. 
 World Bank. (2013).  Water resources management: Sector results profi le .  http://www.worldbank.
org/en/results/2013/04/15/water-resources-management-results-profi le . Accessed 30 Oct 
2014. 
 WWF. (2012).  Shared risk and opportunity in water resources: Seeking a sustainable future for 
Lake Naivasha . Authored by Pegasys Strategy and Development (Pty) Ltd.  http://awsassets.
panda.org/downloads/navaisha_fi nal_08_12_lr.pdf . Accessed 26 Mar 2013. 
 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial 2.5 License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/ ) which permits any 
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) 
and source are credited. 
 The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included 
in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory 
regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or 
reproduce the material.
 
A. Earle and M.J. Neal
